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A Critical Review of Paper Stones and Citizen Politics
H. Steven Green
　Who makes who? Do political parties create votersʼ political identities or do voter 
demands create the platforms of political parties?　A critical review of two classics on 
this topic reveal that the question is as relevant as ever for liberal democracies. A re-
view of Adam Przeworski and John Spragueʼs Paper Stones and Russel J. Daltonʼs Cit-
izen Politics offers more than just insight into distinguished works in the literature of 
comparative political parties.  Knowledge of these two arguments is prerequisite to an 
informed discourse upon the relationship between parties and electorates.  Citizen Poli-
tics and Paper Stones depart from different points and arrive at antithetical conclu-
sions. These works stand in contraposition to each other. They do not allow for ambiv-
alence on the part of the reader and therein lies the great value in comparing them. One 
may not accept Daltonʼs assertion that parties respond to individualsʼ needs and de-
mands as well as Przeworski and Spragueʼs thesis that the peopleʼs demands and needs 
are created by parties. These works present newcomers to the field of party politics the 
chance to discover which approach they would adopt as their own.
　History supports the argument of Paper Stones. Przeworski and Spragueʼs object of 
study is Europeʼs socialist parties. After comparing their work to Daltonʼs, a brief sum-
mary of Carles Boixʼs Political Parties, Growth and Equality shows that the lessons of 
Paper Stones also apply to non-socialist parties as well.  Writing a decade after Prze-
worski and Sprague, Boix points out that Britainʼs Tories not only created a sense of 
identity among the electorate, but they virtually built a new middle-class in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s.
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　Based on his large collection of opinion survey data, Dalton proposes that a new 
type of citizen is emerging in the advanced Western democracies. As the economies of 
countries such as France, Germany and Britain transform into a so-called post-industri-
al age, the value systems of their electorates are entering into an era of post-material-
ism. Standards of living are increasing concurrent with the movement of more jobs into 
the service sector while people are more concerned about issues not directly related to 
their material well-being, such as the environment and social equality. Dalton suggests 
that the modern electorate is becoming increasingly sophisticated:　todayʼs generation 
is better educated than preceding ones; people are thinking more critically and inde-
pendently about political issues and they are relying less upon traditional party align-
ments and cues. Daltonʼs figures demonstrate that, while interest in politics is on the 
rise, the percentage of those who consider themselves political ideologues is on the de-
cline. For example, American National Election data show that over 80％ of Americans 
in 1995 had an “interest in politics” （Dalton, Figure 2. 3, p.27） while in the same year 
only 20％ considered themselves ideologues （Dalton, Figure 2. 4, p.28）.
　Dalton takes aim at the notion of a democratic “super citizen” found only in the writ-
ings of classical theory and not in an actual electorate. The writings of Mill, Locke and 
Tocqueville posit the development of a well-informed, reasonable and politically inter-
ested citizen who seems to reflect the types of people these writers were （or, at least, 
imagined themselves to be） and who is declared to be the foundation for any healthy 
democracy. Scholars such as Almond and Verba pioneered the field of political culture 
studies and they phrased their survey research questions against the assumption that 
they were looking for a classical-type super citizen （Dalton, p.16）. Much to their dis-
appointment, early researchers found neither any ideological structure governing peo-
pleʼs thinking on social issues nor any rational-choice models guiding their thinking. 
Experts found low levels of involvement in the public coupled with ignorance about 
the body politic itself. Dalton cites Berelson, Lazasfeld and McPhee from their work 
Voting:
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　　Our data reveal that certain requirements commonly assumed for the successful 
operation of democracy are not met by the behavior of the “average” 
citizen...Many vote without real involvement in the election...The citizen is not 
highly informed on the details of the campaign...In any rigorous or narrow sense 
the voters are not highly rational （Dalton, p.17）.
　Dalton points out these early works put a positive spin on their findings and con-
cluded with an elitist theory of politics. The original political culture researchers deter-
mined that all the apathy they found was good for democracy because the political sys-
tem would become paralyzed if everyone tried to be involved all of the time. Almond 
and Verba decided that the model citizen “is not the active citizen; he is the potentially 
active citizen,” and Berelson, et al, agreed that “Some people are and should be highly 
interested in politics, but not everyone is or needs to be” （Dalton, p.20）. Remarking on 
the irony of anti-democratic prescriptions for what might ail democracies, Dalton 
launched his work from the position that elitist theory ignores the complexities of dem-
ocratic processes. It is not voters in early studies who are unsophisticated, but the stud-
ies themselves.
　Dalton observes that since the 1950s, advanced industrial societies have changed 
profoundly as have the methods and skills of public opinion research. He draws on the 
work of Ronald Inglehart to say that a process of “cognitive mobilization” had been un-
derway for three decades since then （Dalton, p.21）. Thanks to improvements in educa-
tion, and greater exposure to media and politics since Almond and Verbaʼs day, the 
public now enjoys greater access to political information and can more skillfully pro-
cess this information. People have become more sophisticated, and the research meth-
ods that measure peopleʼs attitudes and thinking have improved.
　In Daltonʼs analysis, the post-war boom in the economies of Europe and North 
America set in motion forces of industrialization that would allow peopleʼs values to 
change. This change would reveal itself as the Baby Boomers began entering adulthood 
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in the 1960s. The industrial age that peaked between the 1920s and the 1950s tied the 
values of the Boomersʼ parents to material well-being more than any other value. Peo-
ple also respected hierarchy and deferred to authority in order to maintain social stabil-
ity as necessary for the functioning of an industrial manufacturing economy. The high 
standards of living produced by the “Greatest Generation” have been taken for granted 
since the sixties and a new generation of voters is encourages attention to issues that 
would have been unimaginable a generation earlier. Support for minority rights, alter-
native lifestyles, and environmental protection has grown among voters whose outlook 
on life can be less materialistic precisely because their material well-being is comfort-
able and secure.
　Traditional approaches to measuring voter participation in party politics were based 
on the notion that parties formed on the sides of social cleavages, an idea most famous-
ly developed by Lipset and Rokkan. The party system of the 1960s reflected the cleav-
ages of the 1920s, when parties recruited people along class lines and had to mobilize 
quickly to capture the surge of new voters after the enfranchisement of women.
　The organizational skills of parties once brought people to elections. Yet, elections 
limit and thereby blur choices. The modern electorate continues to mobilize around 
parties. （Even self-described independents tend to vote for a candidate from one party 
or the other, so few modern democracies have more than token numbers of “indepen-
dent” candidates running or winning legislative seats.） Contemporary voters are more 
policy-oriented, less ideological and prefer involvement in community and civic 
groups to political parties, although many voters participate in other political activities 
outside of parties. As people grow older, they become more likely to vote and to give 
their time to politics, such as activism, campaigning or even running for office at the 
local level or higher. Younger voters reject party politics for the politics of protest. Par-
ty systems rooted in the materialist values of their grandparents are not responding 
quickly enough to their demands, in this view, so younger voters take to the street or 
sign-up for grassroots activities. Dalton refers to Scott Flanagan, one of Almond and 
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Verbaʼs intellectual heirs, who points out that values are shifting in two dimensions: 
from material to non-material values and from slightly authoritarian to more libertarian 
（Dalton, p.94）. Daltonʼs data show that the older generation have, by and large, held 
onto the industrial-age values they acquired, even as their societies have entered a 
post-industrial era （See Figure 5. 3 in Dalton）.
　Having set the stage for how mismatched modern parties are to the emerging new 
citizen, Dalton argues that parties are still the primary basis of public influence. No 
other group can match the representative nature of political parties. The social cleav-
ages in earlier eras that allowed party leaders to plot individual preferences along a 
left-right spectrum have become less and less able to predict voter behavior, he says. 
Dalton explains the rise of new parties, such as the Greens and the National Front, as 
attempts to capture new citizens whose values do not align with established parties. 
Dalton even cites the fact that numerous third parties have appeared in Americaʼs re-
cent history as proof that party systems are “in flux” （Dalton, p.152）. According to 
Dalton, social cues （the opinions and attitudes we hear around us daily） and social ref-
erence points, such as unions or churches, provide shortcuts for making political deci-
sions. Voting along class lines, meanwhile, is declining, and the incomes and lifestyles 
of certain sectors of the working class are merging with those traditionally found in the 
middle class. At the same time, lower level white collar jobs are actually paying less. A 
new middle class that does not conform to Marxʼs analysis is forming. Political partiesʼ 
attempts to broaden their appeal to attract the new middle class cannot keep up with the 
quickening fragmentation of the electorate into multiple, smaller fractions based on 
particular issues. In the resulting absence of clear cues from class and party leaders 
Dalton says that people will think about electoral choices more independently.
　Citizen Politics is vulnerable to criticism on several points. First, considering that it 
is a study of political parties, the book seems to be organized backwards. Rather than 
analyzing so many changes in the electorateʼs behavior prior to any discussion of par-
ties, Daltonʼs argument would be clearer had he first offered a working definition of 
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parties and a summary of the history of party politics. His most precise definition of a 
political party is to compare it to a sports team, loyalty to which “helps one to know 
whom to root for and which players to admire （Dalton, p.205）.
　Second, parties appear as an afterthought in Citizen Politics because it is really a 
work of normative theory more than a social scientific study of voter behavior with at-
tention to parties. Beginning with his critique of the original political culture studies, 
Dalton is more concerned with promoting a particular notion of democracy, than with 
demonstrating processes of dealignment. In Chapter Four he proclaims “I prefer a more 
Jeffersonian view of the democratic process. The logic of democratic politics is that 
expanding political involvement can also expand citizenʼs understanding of the political 
process” In Chapter Ten Dalton announces that “the future is in our hands” and he sup-
ports Rousseauʼs argument against representative democracy in Chapter Eleven.
　Third, his normative emphasis allows him to overlook the need for any causal mech-
anism. For Dalton, class identify is constructed by material conditions, yet the actual 
nexus for change is not identified beyond assuming it necessarily follows economic 
growth. However, as anyone who follows US presidential campaigns knows, post-ma-
terial and material values may co-exist, but even in an America that is wealthier than 
ever since 1945, political parties tend to respond to the latter more than the former. If 
that claim sounds as outdated as the mid-90s publication of the work cited here, con-
sider that the popularity of 2016 US presidential candidates Hilary Clinton and Bernie 
Sanders was based more on their pledges to protect the middle-class, reduce wealth in-
equality and increase access to health care and less on their support for post-material 
values such as inclusivity across gender, race and sexual preference.
　Fourth, Dalton underplays the possibility that parties, and not only churches or 
unions, may act as social cues and social references. He does not consider the possibili-
ty of a symbiotic relationship between organizations and individuals. Even if groups 
originally formed as a collective expression of individual wills, they perpetuate them-
selves by trying to persuade other individuals.
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　Finally, parties can do more than just people identities: they can also create econom-
ic identities. Where Dalton sees a new middle class merely emerging inevitably from 
economic growth, Carles Boix sees a political party perpetuation its existence by creat-
ing a new middle class.
　The ability of parties to articulate demands for individuals is the point of departure 
for Przeworski and Spragueʼs Paper Stones. In this work we see that individual identi-
ties do not come from within but from without. Institutions make identities by articu-
lating where people stand in relation to structures and to each other. Political parties, 
not individual people, make class an issue because only they can organize workers. Pa-
per Stones, say the authors, “is a study of voting but not of voters” （Przeworski and 
Sprague, p.167）. In direct refutation of Dalton, they reject realignment. “Perhaps the 
social and cultural meaning of voting behavior has changed, but the numerical relations 
between class position and voting behavior remain remarkably stable” （Ibid.）.
　Socialist parties have never won a majority of a European electorate. In the first 
place, the very group they represent- workers- has never constituted a majority of the 
adult population of any nation, with the exception of Belgium in the 1930s. Yet, when-
ever socialist parties have tried to broaden their appeal to include non-workers, they 
have lost the support of many workers. Przeworski and Sprague demonstrate mathe-
matically that for every non-worker recruited by socialists, a greater number of workers 
give their vote to another party. Dalton cannot explain this phenomenon.
　Why would people abandon their demands and needs just because their party was 
trying to include more supporters on the same platform?　When socialist parties at-
tempt to reach out to that voters outside the working class, they must expand their plat-
form to include issues that do not appeal to class and in so doing weaken the salience 
of class as an issue. When class becomes less salient, workers are open to appeals from 
other parties. Paper Stones uncovers and electoral trade-off between workersʼ votes and 
middle-class votes. “A party which receives votes from N allies…can never hope to 
conquer the votes of all workers if it received the vote of a single ally” （Ibid., pp.70⊖
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71）. The logic of the electoral trade-off facing socialist parties reveal cross-national 
differences in electoral socialism. The degree of the trade-off varies across countries. 
In each of the subject nations in Paper Stones communist parties as well as religious 
and ethnic groups compete with socialist parties for workersʼ votes. Cross-national out-
comes also show that the voter identification comes from above, i.e. from groups such 
as political parties.
　In the Scandinavian countries （Denmark, Norway, Sweden） neither regional ethnic 
parties nor religious parties are as competitive as similar parties in Belgium, France 
and Germany. Once the salience of class weakens in these three countries, parties ap-
pealing to workersʼ regional or religious identity gain support. However, the greatest 
differences between the two groups of nations reveal themselves in the nature of labor 
unions and parliamentary organizations. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden union 
membership is high, is enrolled in high concentrations within a single federation and 
has powerful centralized bargaining bodies. Scandinavian unions create class member-
ship and class identity. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, socialists can make bra-
od-based appeals and lose few workers thanks to unions ability to capture and hold not 
only workersʼ votes but also their identities as workers （Ibid., p.13）.  To the south, 
where unions are less corporatist, the electoral trade-off imposes a greater penalty on 
socialist parties and strong church and ethnic parties can pick up the workers lost by 
the socialists. Yet, Przeworski and Sprague note, the very cohesiveness of the unions 
prevents the Scandinavian socialists from maximizing their electoral potential, anyway. 
Unions control a large share of party funding and enough issues overlap between par-
ties and unions that the parties cannot stray from their core membership.
　Przeworski and Sprague highlight the causal relationship between parties and votersʼ 
preferences. In so doing they cast light on the shadowy causality of psychological-
ly-work such as Daltonʼs. Works like Citizen Politics:
　　cite individual attributes to explain individual attributes... In this logic some social 
distinctios are first objectified as cleavages. Places in these cleavages are attribut-
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ed to individuals, and after this reduction the locations in the structure of society 
appear as individual trains such as worker, Catholic, or woman. These traits are 
thought to determine acts because they are viewed as representing interests, inter-
nalized norms, psychological attachments and the like... Through this reduction 
the locus of causality is placed within the individual （Ibid., pp.6⊖7）.
　Where Citizen Politics is unable to explain the nature of the relationship between the 
invididual and the group, or between the voter and the party, Paper Stones notes, “In 
nature causes are causes no one can do anything to alter them. The causal structure of 
the natural world is given, but the causal structure of society is not. The causes of indi-
vidual behavior are produced by people in interaction with one another （Ibid., p.7）. 
Przeworski and Sprague demonstrate that parties formulate with demands for voters. 
Carles Boix proves that parties can not only create a sense of class identity, such as Eu-
ropean socialists do, but may also create a class itself.
　Boixʼs Political Parties, Growth and Equality examines ways that political parties 
mediate the forces of economic globalization. For this purposes of this review, we may 
dispense with a summary of Boixʼs entire argument and concentrate on his analysis of 
Britainʼs Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher.
　On the one hand, the Toriesʼ situation in the 1970s fits Daltonʼs descriptions of 
dealignment. Throughout the post-war period, the Conservatives and Labour had each 
drawn support from their “natural” class: Tories and Labour were receiving two-thirds 
of middle-class and working class votes, respectively （Boix, p.182）. By the mid-sev-
enties, notes Boix, only fifty percent of the electorate was voting along traditional class 
lines, and, “［a］s result, the votersʼ opinions on both policies and partiesʼ performanc-
es in offices started to have more weight in explaining the vote than all structural so-
cio-economic characteristics combined” （Ibid.）.
　From this statement we may concede Dalton the point that dealignment contains at 
least a partial basis in votersʼ preferences. Throughout this period, as Dalton observes, 
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the number of workers changed their social position from working class to middle class 
and, as Boix notes, this transformation fed the Tory ranks while starving the support 
base of Labour. However, dealignment was incomplete at best as the inability of the 
Liberal Party to win pluralities, much less majorities, demonstrates. In 1979 nearly 
two-thirds of professionals and managers, and 62％ of people in intermediate-level 
jobs voted for the Conservatives. By 1992 these numbers declined slightly to around 
50％ among voters in all non-manual sectors, yet these losses were balanced by the 
growth of these jobs as a proportion of the population （Ibid., p.183）.
　The statistics prove that economic factors outweigh post-material values. The most 
convincing point in support of Przeworski and Spragueʼs thesis is found in the Toriesʼ 
electoral strategy. “The growth of an electorate more inclined to choose Conservative 
was also the work of an explicit political strategy devised by the Thatcher government” 
（Ibid.）. Boix adds that:
　　the Conservative government engineered a vast sale of council houses in the hope 
of securing more votes to the cause of free markets and to the defense of property. 
Similarly, home mortages were granted a privileged tax statement, and the interest 
rates were carefully managed to favor homeowners. Second, the sale of public 
corporations was consciously designed to maximize its impact on the population. 
As ［Chancellor Nigel］ Lawson put it, ʻThe widespread ownership of private prop-
erty ［would give］ the citizen a vital sense of identification with the society of 
which he is a part （Ibid.）.
　The Thatcher-led Tories, then, consciously formulated a strategy that would not only 
provide voters with material benefits but also a strong sense of identity from those ben-
efits that would, of course, secure and stabilize the Conservative Partyʼs incumbency.
　Where Paper Stones demonstrates identification flowing from socialist parties to 
voters, Boix shows it can come from conservative parties. Contrary to the bottom-up 
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notion of political will and identities in Citizen Politics, Boix, and Przeworski and 
Sprague proves political parties can create political identities and even classes.
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